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The Application of the North Carolina Motor Vehicle Act and

the Uniform Commercial Code to the Sale of Motor Vehicles by
Consignment: American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton
Approximately two-thirds of the automobiles sold in the United States are
sold on an installment sale basis,1 and credit extended for automobile purchases
accounts for more than one-third of the total consumer credit extended in the
American economy. 2 Regulating automobile credit is a concern of state legislatures, nearly all of which have enacted statutes to protect automobile buyers,
sellers, and financiers. 3 Commentators have noted, however, that these statutory schemes (usually embodied in certificate of title statutes) 4 are more suitable
to the turn of the century, horse-and-buggy era than to today's national automobile market. 5 Indeed, the present system '6is so unworkable that "[e]uthanasia
[may be] the only merciful answer for it."
Much of this unworkability is caused by internal conflicts in the statutory
schemes for regulating automobile transfers. The North Carolina Supreme
Court in American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton7 recently addressed a conflict in

the North Carolina statutes regarding transfers of automobiles. The conflicting8
statutes examined by the Howerton court were the Motor Vehicle Act (MVA)
and the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). 9 Section 52.1 of the MVA provides
1. In a typical installment sale arrangement, the vendor tenders title and delivers the goods to
the purchaser, who contracts with the vendor to pay the sales price in the future. The purchaser's
debt is to be paid a portion at a time, at given intervals. Such installments generally include a
predetermined finance charge. The vendor usually will attempt to reserve some interest in the goods
delivered, so that the vendor may repossess the goods should the purchaser fail to pay the agreed
installments. See J.WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 26-1 to -11 (2d ed. 1980); Note, Retail Installment Sales-UnruhAct Permits Use
ofPrevious BalanceMethod in ComputingFinance Chargeson Revolving CreditAccounts-Siebert v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 16 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 416 (1976).
2. Myers, Multi-State Motor Vehicle Transactions Under the Uniform Commercial Code" An
Update, in IC SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UCC (MB) § 30A.01(2)(a) (1984).
3. See Comment, The California Used CarDealer and the Foreign Lien-A Study in the Conflict of Laws, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 543, 573-89 (1959).
4. A certificate of title statute requires that owners of automobiles register their ownership
with the state. The state usually will issue a written certificate of title, evidencing that ownership.
See id.; infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
5. See Myers, supranote 2, at § 30A.01; see also Leary, Horseand Buggy Lien Law and Migratory Automobiles, 96 U. PA. L. REV.455, 457 (1948); Welsh, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles
Under Section 9-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 265 (1968); Note, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles Under the UCC: A New Chassisfor Certificateof Title Legislation, 70
YALE L.J. 995 (1961).
6. Myers, supra note 2, § 30A.01(2)(a).
7. 311 N.C. 151, 316 S.E.2d 186 (1984).
8. The Motor Vehicle Act was enacted piecemeal, beginning in 1937. See Act of March 23,
1937, ch. 407, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 787. It reached its present state in 1963 and is codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 20-1 to 20-372 (1983). See infra notes 51-78 and accompanying text for a description
of the statute's history.
9. The Uniform Commercial Code was adopted by North Carolina in 1965. See Act of May
26, 1965, ch. 700, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 768. The general assembly amended certain provisions
dealing with automobile sales in 1975. Act of June 26th, 1975, ch. 862, 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws 1228.
The UCC is found in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to 25-11-108 (1965 & Supp. 1983). See infra
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that unless an automobile dealer transfers a state issued certificate of title 10 to
the purchaser, no title to the automobile passes.11 Section 2-401(2) of the UCC
12
provides that when the vendor delivers the car, title passes to the purchaser.
The Howerton court resolved this conflict in favor of the UCC title-passing pro-

visions. 13 This Note examines that resolution in light of the historical and practical underpinnings of the MVA and the UCC.

In October 1978 plaintiff American Clipper Corp. (Clipper), a manufacturer of recreational vehicles, delivered a recreational vehicle to Adventure

America, Inc. (Adventure).1 4 Adventure, a dealer, maintained a lot on which it
displayed other parties' vehicles to prospective buyers. 15 Adventure did not pay
Clipper for the vehicle when it was delivered. Instead, the arrangement between

Clipper and Adventure, based on an informal understanding, 16 called for Adventure to secure a willing purchaser for the vehicle and to notify Clipper when
a purchaser had been found. Adventure then would make arrangements to

purchase the vehicle from Clipper. The supreme court characterized this informal arrangement as a consignment, 17 although the parties had never expressly

termed it as such.' 8 Clipper could reclaim possession of the vehicle at any time
prior to Adventure's purchase from Clipper. 19 Clipper retained possession of its
manufacturer's statement of origin (MSO). 20 Clipper neither executed a securnotes 82-85, 127 and accompanying text and note 109 for a description of the UCC's history in
North Carolina.
10. The precise issue in Howerton was more problematic because when the vendor in Howerton
sold the car, no certificate of title had yet been issued by the state. For a discussion of the North
Carolina certificate of title statutes, see infra notes 120, 122 and accompanying text.
11. "Upon sale of a new vehicle by a dealer to a consumer-purchaser, the dealer shall execute
. . .an assignment of the manufacturer's certificate of origin. . . and no title to a new motor vehicle
. . . shall pass or vest until such assignment is executed ...." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-52.1(c)
(1983). For a fuller discussion of this and other title passing provisions of the MVA, see infra notes
51-74 and accompanying text.
12. "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed, title passes to the buyer at the time and place at which
the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the goods,. . . even
though a document of title is to be delivered at a different time or place ..
" N.C. GEN. STAT
§ 25-2-401(2) (1965).
13. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 192-93.
14. 'The only written document related to [this] shipment was a writing dated October 10,
1978, on Clipper stationary ...
. This document... identified the vehicle and revealed a price of
$15,076.00. The document specified at the bottom, 'This is not a [sic] invoice.'" Record at 10.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Id.
17. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 193. "'Ihe hallmark of the consignment. . . is
the absence of an absolute obligation on the part of the consignee to pay for the goods.'" Hawkland,
ConsignmentSelling Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 67 COM. L.J. 146, 147 (1962). See Duesenberg, Consignments Under the UCC, A Comment on Emerging Principles, 26 Bus. LAw 565
(1970); Annot., 40 A.L.R.3D 1078 (1971).
18. The supreme court found that the arrangement between Adventure and Clipper implied
that a sale by Adventure to a consumer would be contemporaneous with a sale by Clipper to Adventure. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 193.
19. Record at 11.
20. A manufacturer's certificate is described as "[a] certification on a form ... signed by the
manufacturer, indicating the name of the person or dealer to whom the. . . vehicle is transferred,
the date of transfer, and that such vehicle is the first transfer of such vehicle in ordinary trade and
commerce." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01(20) (1983). The certificate also must describe the vehicle
in detail. Id.
Clipper had purchased parts of the vehicle from Chrysler, which had obtained the original MSO
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ity agreement 21 with Adventure, nor filed a financing statement 22 with the state
of North Carolina.
In April 1979 defendant Walter S. Howerton agreed to purchase the vehicle
23
from Adventure. Adventure agreed to arrange financing of the purchase price.
Adventure had established a regular business practice of arranging financing for
its customers with defendant financing company Finance America, Inc. (Finance). 2 4 Upon Finance's approval of Howerton's credit, Adventure and Howerton executed an installment sales contract. 25 Adventure then assigned its
interest in the installment sales contract to Finance, which paid the purchase
price to Adventure. 26 After Howerton completed and forwarded to Adventure
an application for a North Carolina certificate of title,27 Adventure abandoned

its normal financing procedure. Based on past practice, Finance relied on Adventure to submit Howerton's application for title, together with the appropriate

MSO, to the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Adventure never submitted
Howerton's application; as a result, the vehicle remained untitled. 28 In addition,
for the vehicle. Chrysler supplied Clipper with the original MSO, and Clipper obtained a supplemental MSO in accordance with California law. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 5600 (West 1971). Clipper
obtained a duplicate MSO from Chrysler after the original was lost, and retained this duplicate and
its own supplemental MSO. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 154, 316 S.E.2d at 187.
21. "'Security agreement' means an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-105(1) (Supp. 1983). A " '[s]ecurity interest' means an interest in
personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation." Id. § 25-1201(37). If Clipper had entered into an express security agreement with Adventure, Clipper could
have obtained a security interest in the vehicle. (Clipper claimed that a security interest had been
created despite the absence of an express agreement. See infra notes 107-110 and accompanying
text.) Possessing a security interest in the vehicle could have helped Clipper in either of two ways.
Possessing the interest would have given Clipper an interest to assert against defendant financing
company. (The litigation was framed basically as a contest to see whether Clipper or the financing
company could assert superior interest in the vehicle. See infra notes 32-34.) In addition, if Clipper
had possessed a security interest, it could have taken steps to ensure that if Adventure defaulted,
Clipper could take possession of the vehicle. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-403 (Supp. 1983). See
generally J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note I, §§ 26-1 to -11 (describing creditor's options in
case of default on a secured obligation, including self-help, repossession, foreclosure, and resale).
22. A financing statement is a document signed by both the debtor and the secured party and
includes a description of the property in which the security interest has been created. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-9-402(a) (Supp. 1983). In order to render most types of security interests completely
enforceable, the party in whose favor the interest has been created must file a financing statement
with the office prescribed in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-401 (Supp. 1983). See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 23-11 to -16; infra note 132 and accompanying text.
23. Record at 11-12.
24. Id. at 12.
25. For a general description of instalhlient sale arrangements, see supra note 1. In this particular instance, Howerton made a cash down payment, was allowed a trade-in credit, and was obligated to pay a remaining balance of $15,500. This debt was payable to Adventure in monthly
installments. The record does not show whether an express security agreement between Adventure
and Howerton existed. See Record at 11-12.
26. Record at 12-13.
27. The owner of a new vehicle is required to submit to the Division of Motor Vehicles an
application for a certificate of title, including the owner's name and address, a description of the
vehicle, and a description of the owner's title and of all liens on the vehicle. This application must be
accompanied by the manufacturer's certificate of origin, assigned to the owner. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-52 (1983). The Division then issues a certificate of title on which is recorded all the information
supplied by the application. Id. § 20-57. Security interests may be noted on the certificate. Id. § 2058 to -58.10. It is unlawful to operate a vehicle for which a certificate has not been issued. Id. § 20Ill.
28. Record at 12.
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Adventure never notified Clipper that the vehicle had been sold, nor did it make
29
any payment to Clipper.
Clipper discovered in June 1979 that the vehicle was no longer on Adventure's lot.30 After learning of the sale and of the nature of the financing, Clipper
entered into negotiations with Finance, the assignee of Adventure's interest in
the installment sales contract, and Howerton. These negotiations resulted in a
partial settlement agreement. 3 1 The agreement provided that Howerton would
retain possession of the vehicle and that Clipper would institute a declaratory
judgment proceeding against Finance for the purpose of adjudicating title to the
vehicle. In addition, Clipper agreed to forward its MSO to Finance. Upon receipt of the MSO, Finance agreed to forward the MSO and application for a
certificate of title to the DMV. The certificate of title was to list Howerton as
owner and was to note a lien in favor of Finance for the sole purpose of defending the declaratory judgment action brought by Clipper. Howerton assigned his
right, title, and interest in the vehicle to Finance. Finance thereby became obli32
gated to defend both Howerton's interest in the vehicle and its own. Most
importantly, the parties agreed that if, in the declaratory judgment proceeding,
Clipper's right to the vehicle was declared to be superior 33 to that of either Fi34
nance or Howerton, Finance would be liable to Clipper.
At trial Clipper argued that "neither defendant acquired rights in and to
the vehicle superior to [Clipper's] own by reason of [Adventure's] attempted
conversion of [the vehicle]." '3 5 Clipper claimed that, under section 52.1 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, a motor vehicle dealer cannot transfer title to
a new vehicle to a purchaser without proper assignment of an MSO. 3 6 Since an
MSO was not assigned to Howerton, no title had passed to him. Clipper argued
that because the sale by Adventure to Howerton was not valid and because no
sale had been made by Clipper to Adventure, Clipper retained title to the vehicle. Clipper argued in the alternative that if title had in fact passed to Howerton, retention of the MSO had reserved a security interest in Clipper. This
interest, Clipper asserted, had attached to the installment sales contract and
vested in Clipper title superior to the title Finance claimed. 37
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. The basic terms of this agreement are set forth in Howerton, 311 N.C. at 155-56, 316 S.E.2d

at 188-89.
32. See Record at 4-8. The partial settlement agreement further provided that Howerton's only
liability was to stem from the installment sales contract, and that he could incur no liability as a
result of a judgment in the action brought by Clipper. Id. at 7.
33. The parties never defined in the agreement what constituted "superiority" of title. See
Howerton, 311 N.C. at 156, 316 S.E.2d at 189.
34. Adventure was not made party to the settlement negotiations or to the litigation. Id. at
155, 316 S.E.2d at 188.
35. Plaintiff Appellee's Brief at 6, Howerton, 51 N.C. App. 539, 277 S.E.2d 136.

36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-52.1(c), which provides that "no title to a new motor vehicle
• ..shall pass or vest"until such assignment is executed and the motor vehicle delivered to the
transferee." The provision does not state expressly the result of the manufacturer's rather than the
dealer's retention of the MSO. See infra note 125.
37. See infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
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Finance argued that the UCC, not the MVA, should apply to resolve the
question of title. Finance argued that, under the UCC, title to the vehicle had
passed to Howerton when he purchased the vehicle. Thus, Clipper had no title
to assert against either Howerton or Finance. The UCC explicity states the time
and place in which title passes to a good faith purchaser, such as Howerton.3 8
The North Carolina version of the UCC provides that unless otherwise agreed,
title passes when the goods are delivered, even though a document of title is to
be delivered later. 39 Since title passed completely to Howerton when the vehicle
was delivered to him, Finance argued, Clipper could not prevail against either
Finance or Howerton.
Before trial the parties stipulated that no material facts were at issue. Both
Finance and Clipper moved for summary judgment. The trial court, in granting
Clipper's motion, found that Clipper could assert title superior to Finance's
"under applicable law." 4 The court therefore found Finance liable to Clipper
under the parties' partial settlement agreement.
The court of appeals affirmed. 4 1 Judge Becton, writing for a unanimous
court, agreed with Clipper's contention that Clipper's title was superior to Finance's. The court based its opinion on the title passage provisions set forth in
the North Carolina MVA. The court reasoned that title could not pass until the
MSO was properly assigned, 42 hence, record title remained in Clipper. 43 The
court found that Finance assumed the risk of loss when it loaned money on
collateral without first determining whether its assignor, Adventure, or its
debtor, Howerton, had record title to that collateral. 44 The court further found
that Clipper, by retaining its MSO, did the most it could to protect its interest. 45
A unanimous supreme court, in an opinion by Justice Exum, reversed the
court of appeals, holding that the UCC, not the MVA, controlled. 46 Analyzing
the case as a consignment under the UCC, the court found that Clipper had
taken none of the steps by which a consignor can protect his interest in consigned goods. 47 In addition the court found that Clipper had taken no steps to
protect any interest it might have had in the installment sales contract. 48 Since
Clipper had no interest in the vehicle or the contract, it could not assert a title
superior to that claimed by Finance or Howerton. The supreme court then
38. The parties stipulated that Howerton was a "buyer in the ordinary course of business" as
that term is defined by the UCC. Record at 12.
39. N.C. GE. STAT. § 25-2-401(2) (1965). See supra note 12 for language of the statute.
40. Record at 19. Judge Riddle, the trial judge, did not decide expressly whether the UCC or
the MVA was "the applicable law." Id.
41. American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton, 51 N.C. App. 539, 545, 277 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1981),
rev'd, 311 N.C. 151, 316 S.E.2d 186 (1984).
42. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-52.1(c) (1983), set forth supra note 11.
43. American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton, 51 N.C. App. 539, 544, 277 S.E.2d 136, 139 (1981),
rev'd, 311 N.C. 151, 316 S.E.2d 186 (1984).

44. Id.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 192-93.
Id. at 164-65, 316 S.E.2d at 194.
Id. at 166-68, 316 S.E.2d at 194-95.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63

granted summary judgment for Finance.4 9
The MVA and the UCC have generated voluminous litigation.50 The original version of the MVA, enacted in 1937,51 provided that once the purchaser
tendered payment for a motor vehicle, and received delivery of the vehicle, the
transfer was valid. 5 2 Transfer of ownership without delivery of a certificate of
title on which were recorded all existing liens did not invalidate the transfer, but
did constitute a misdemeanor. 53 Soon after this statute was enacted, litigants
attempted to secure a judicial declaration that the statute served as a recordation
device for title to, and liens on, automobiles. 54 North Carolina previously had
enacted statutes invalidating titles to, and mortgages on, realty and some forms
of personalty, unless the title or mortgage was registered with the state.5 5 The
North Carolina Supreme Court, however, had rejected this interpretation of the
predecessor to the MVA in 1925.56 In CarolinaDiscount Corp. v. Landis Motor
Co.57 the court characterized the statute as a police regulation, with penal provisions "to protect the general public from fraud, imposition and theft of motor
vehicles." 5 8 The court also determined that the statute did not change the common-law rule that sales of personal property were not required to be evidenced
by a writing and held that certificates of title to automobiles did not determine
rights of litigants in disputes arising out of automobile transfers. 59
Courts accepted this interpretation for several decades, not because this interpretation presented the soundest public policy, but because of the courts' deference to the general assembly. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
the rule of Carolina Discount Corp. in 1960 in Southern Auto Finance Co. v.
Pittman.6° The Pittman court examined sections of the 1937 MVA which provided that the owner of a motor vehicle must be registered with the Department
of Motor Vehicles (DMV). 6 1 When the owner made proper application, the
DMV provided a certificate indicating all liens and encumbrances. 62 The Pittman court found that the general assembly, in enacting these sections, did not
intend to exempt motor vehicles from the recordation statutes, 63 which provided
a separate system for establishing ownership of personal property. 4 The court
49. Id. at 170, 316 $.E.2d at 197.

50. See, ag., cases cited infra note 101.
51. Act of March 23, 1937, ch. 407, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 787.
52. Id. § 38, 804-05.
53. Id.
54. See, eg., National Bank v. Greensboro Motor Co., 264 N.C. 568, 142 S.E.2d 166 (1965).
55. See N.C. GEN.STAT. §§ 47-1 to 47-120 (1984).
56. Act of March 5, 1923, ch. 236, 1923 N.C. Sess. Laws 554 was the predecessor to the MVA,
This Act required a centralized registration of all motor vehicles with the Department of Revenue.
It did not invalidate sales made without transfer of title certificates.
57. 190 N.C. 157, 129 S.E. 414 (1925).
58. Id. at 160, 129 S.E. at 416.
59. Id.
60. 253 N.C. 550, 117 S.E.2d 423 (1960).
61. Act of March 23, 1937, ch. 407, §§ 37-38, 1937 N.C. Sess. Laws 787, 804-05.
62. Id. §§ 12, 36-38, at 793, 804-05.
63. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-1 to 47-120 (1984).
64. Pittman, 253 N.C. at 553-54, 117 S.E.2d at 425.
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did state, however, that "if public policy [required] a different system of establishing ownership and encumbrances on motor vehicles, such policy must be
'65
declared by the Legislature."
The general assembly soon responded to the needs of public policy. The
lien recordation statute in existence at the time of Pittman provided that mortgages on personal property were to be recorded, in many cases, in the office of
the register of deeds in the county in which the property was located. 66 Since
cars are easily driven from one county to another, chances are great that a car on
which there is a mortgage will not be sold in the county in which it was located
when mortgaged. A prospective purchaser of an automobile would have had to
investigate title records in many, if not all, of the counties in the state to discover
the nature of the title to any motor vehicle. By 1960, when Pittman was decided, the volume of vehicle sales and the ease of vehicle transportation had
become so great that the general assembly decided to lighten this burden on the
prospective purchaser.
The general assembly amended the MVA in 1961.67 Under the amended
act every owner of a motor vehicle still was required to register his vehicle with
the DMV, and the DMV continued to issue certificates of title noting all liens
and encumbrances. 68 The 1961 amendments expressly provided that "[tiransfer
of ownership in a vehicle by an owner [was] not effective" until the vendor's
certificate of title had been assigned and transferred to the purchaser, and the
new vehicle had been delivered. 69 The purchaser then was required to present
the assigned certificate to the DMV, which issued a new certificate to the purchaser. 70 The general assembly hoped to provide, by means of the title certification procedure, a method whereby all legal interests in motor vehicles could be
determined easily. 71 These amendments took several important steps toward
achieving that legislative goal. Liens no longer had to be recorded in the county
in which the lienor or the vehicle was located. 72 A purchaser, after the 1961
amendments, merely had to look at the certificate of title to discover liens.
The 1961 amendments, for the first time, also made provision for a manufacturer's certificate of origin. A manufacturer was required to supply a dealer
to whom he transferred a newly manufactured vehicle with a DMV form which
certified that the vehicle had not previously been transferred. 73 When the dealer
sold the vehicle to a consumer, the amendment required the dealer to transfer
the MSO to the consumer. The consumer then was obligated to submit the
65. Id. at 553, 117 S.E.2d at 425.
66. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20.2 (1984) for the corresponding present provisions regarding
mortgages on personalty.
67. Act of June 15, 1961, ch. 835, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 1134.
68. Id. § 8, at 1139.
69. Id.
70. See id. § 3, at 1135.
71. Id. at 1134.
72. Id. § 12. The amendments stated that the mortgage recordation provisions no longer applied to motor vehicles. All vehicle mortgages were required by the amendments to be recorded
directly on the title certificate.
73. Id. §§ 1-4, at 1134-35.
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74
MSO to the DMV, along with his application for a certification of title.

The first decision interpreting the 1961 amendments was Community Credit
Co., Inc. v. Norwood.75 The Norwood court found that the amendments

make it the duty of the purchaser to secure from his vendor the old
certificate duly endorsed or assigned and to apply for a new certificate. . . . The vesting of title is deferred until the purchaser has the
old certificate 76
endorsed to him and makes application for a new certificate [of title].
The general assembly further refined the title-passing provisions of the

MVA in 1963. The language of the provisions was changed slightly to mandate
that "no title to any motor vehicle shall pass or vest until assignment [of the title
'77
certificate] is executed and the motor vehicle delivered to the transferee."

These sections of the MVA were strengthened in 1967. The provisions added in
1967 stated that a dealer, having obtained title to a new vehicle from a manufac-

turer, could not transfer that title to a consumer without also transferring the
MSO to the consumer. 78 These amendments, however, contained no provision

to control consignment situations, like the one in Howerton, in which the manufacturer originally made no transfer of the MSO to the dealer.

The supreme court offered its interpretation of the revised wording in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hayes.79 The Hayes court ruled that the
amendment imposed three conditions precedent on any transfer of title to a motor vehicle. First, the vendor must execute an assignment of the certificate of

title to the purchaser. Second, there must be actual or constructive delivery of
the vehicle to the purchaser. Last, the duly assigned title certificate must be
delivered to the purchaser.80 The Hayes court expressly limited its decision,
74. See id. § 3, at 1135.
75. 257 N.C. 87, 125 S.E.2d 369 (1962).
76. Id. at 90, 125 S.E.2d at 371. The court in National Bank v. Greensboro Motor Co., 264
N.C. 568, 142 S.E.2d 166 (1965), also relied on the language in the 1961 amendments which provided that "transfer of ownership . . . is not effective" until the title certificate is transferred, in
determining that a mortgage created on two trucks was invalid. The mortgagor had taken possession of the trucks from a vendor, and prior to receiving the title certificate had created a mortgage on
the trucks. See also Seymour v. W. S. Boyd Sales Co., 257 N.C. 603, 127 S.E.2d 265 (1962).
77. Act of May 24, 1963, ch. 552, § 4, 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 648 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-72 (b) (1983)). The wording of the 1961 amendments had provided that "transfer of ownership
in a vehicle was not effective" until assignment and transfer of the title certificate. Act of June 15,
1961, ch. 835, §8, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 1134.
78. Act of June 21, 1967, ch. 863, § 1, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws I110 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-52.1(c) (1983)).
79. 276 N.C. 620, 174 S.E.2d 511 (1970).
80. Id. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524. The Hayes court had to determine whether an insurance
policy afforded protection for defendant against certain claims resulting from an automobile accident. Plaintiffhad issued defendant a non-owner's policy. The non-owner's policy provided that if
defendant acquired ownership of an automobile during the period covered by the policy, policy
coverage would lapse 30 days after acquisition of the automobile. Defendant thereafter contracted
to purchase a car. The car was delivered December 26th. Defendant tendered payment on December 27th. On December 28th, the seller assigned and delivered the title certificate to defendant. On
January 27th, defendant was involved in the accident in question. Id. at 622-25, 174 S.E.2d at 51214. If the court had found that defendant acquired ownership when payment was made and the car
delivered, the policy would have lapsed before the accident. If the court had found defendant did
not acquire ownership until the certificate of title was delivered, however, the policy would have
remained in effect through the date of the accident. Although the 1961 amendments spoke in terms
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declaring that the three conditions it announced as prerequisite to transfer of
purposes of determining tort law liability and liability intitle only applied 8for
1
surance coverage.

The UCC was enacted in North Carolina in 1965,82 two years after the
enactment of the MVA amendments from which the Hayes court derived its
standard for determining passage of automobile title. The Hayes court held that
the UCC did not replace the 1963 amendments to the MVA as a means for
determining legal interests in automobiles.8 3 The court relied on the express
language of the UCC in declaring that the UCC did not supplant the transfer of
title provisions of the MVA. Section 10-102 of the UCC lists the statutes re84
pealed by the passage of the UCC; the MA is not listed. Section 10-103 of
85
the UCC, however, repeals all other statutes inconsistent with the UCC.
The Hayes court relied on the official commentary to section 2-401 to refute
the contention that insofar as the MVA title passage provisions were inconsistent
with section 2-401 of the UCC, the MVA provisions were repealed by passage of
the UCC. This commentary indicates that section 2-401 is designed to govern
private transactions and not to guide the court's interpretation of public regulation. 86 Courts remain free to decide how title passes in situations in which public regulations call for such determination. Thus, the Hayes court found that,
because the MVA was a public regulation, passage of title thereunder was not
governed by the "private sale" rules of the UCC.8 7 In addition the Hayes court
declared that section 2-401 of the UCC was general in scope and governed passage of title to "goods." Thus, section 2-401 should not affect statutes governing
of ownership, the 1963 revisions provided that "title will not pass or vest" until the certificate of title
is transferred. Act of May 24, 1963, ch. 552, § 4, 1963 N.C. Sess. Laws 648. The Hayes court found,
after a lengthy restatement of previous definitions, that "title" and "ownership" are synonymous,
276 N.C. at 630, 174 S.E.2d at 517, and thus, because the policy revoked coverage if the defendant
acquired ownership of a motor vehicle, the court decided that defendant did not acquire title to the
car until the certificate of title was delivered to him. Id. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524.
81. Hayes, 276 N.C. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524. The MVA has long provided that the certificate
of title is "prima facie evidence" of ownership in tort cases arising out of automobile accidents. Act
of March 30, 1951, ch. 494, § 1, 1951 N.C. Sess. Laws 405-06 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 2071.1 (1983)). The Howerton court did not expressly consider this section of the MVA.
82. Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 700, 1965 N.C. Sess. Laws 768, enacted the UCC in North Carolina. The UCC became effective July 1, 1967. Id.
83. Hayes, 276 N.C. at 638-40, 174 S.E.2d at 522-24 (1970).
84. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-10-102(1) (1965).
85. Id. § 25-10-103 (1965).
86. The commentary states:
[Section 2-401] in no way intends to indicate which line of interpretation should be followed in cases where the applicability of "public" regulation depends upon "sale" or upon
location of "title" without further definition. The basic policy of this Article that known
purpose and reason should govern interpretation cannot extend beyond the scope of its
own provisions. It is therefore necessary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes
under this Article in case the courts deem any public regulation to incorporate the defined
term of the private law.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-401 official comment (1965). The drafters of the UCC did not intend the
UCC to supplement the MVA in the operation of the MVA as aid to government regulation of
automobile registration. The drafters made it clear that, when necessary, courts should interpret
"sale" or "location of title" for purposes of regulatory statutes such as the MVA, to best further the
goals of those regulatory statutes.
87. Hayes, 276 N.C. at 639, 174 S.E.2d at 523.
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passage of title to more specific categories of goods. Because the MVA dealt
specifically and definitely with passage of title to motor vehicles, the Hayes court
found that the MVA could not be supplanted or repealed by the UCC, even
88
though the UCC was enacted after the MVA.
The Howerton court addressed whether the three conditions in Hayes applied to a question of title not involving tort liability or insurance coverage and
whether passage of the UCC in 1965 rendered the 1963 amendments to the
MVA obsolete as a means for settling disputes over transfers of automobile ownership. To decide these two issues, the Howerton court initially had to determine
whether a party could acquire ownership of a vehicle without assignment and
delivery of a title certificate.
If the Hayes standard for transfer of ownership applied, no ownership
would have been transferred to Adventure; to its assignee, Finance; or to Howerton. Finance contended that under section 2-401(2) 89 of the North Carolina
version of the UCC, title passed to Howerton when the vehicle was delivered to
him, even though the certificate of title was never assigned or delivered to
Howerton.
The Howerton court distinguished Hayes on two grounds. First, Hayes
dealt with the rights of third parties not involved in the sale of the automobileinsurance carriers-while Howerton involved a determination of the rights of the
vendor and purchaser of the automobile. 90 In addition, the Hayes court limited
its decision to a determination of tort liability and insurance coverage, thus leaving "open the question whether the MVA, as opposed to the UCC, would control in all circumstances." 9 1
The Howerton court did not directly refute the reasoning that led the Hayes
court to apply the MVA. Instead, it offered an alternative rationale for adopting
the UCC standards for passage of title. The court examined the North Carolina
commentary to section 2-401 and deduced the legislative intent behind the UCC.
The commentary states that the UCC abandons the examination of sales disputes that made "rights, obligations and remedies of sellers, buyers, and third
parties dependent on the location of title of goods at a particular time. . . providing [instead] specific provisions with respect to the various rights and duties
of the buyer and seller which are not predicated on location of title."'92 The
Howerton court stressed that this commentary evidenced the intent of the general assembly that the courts no longer should employ "the concept of title as a
'93
tool for resolving sales problems."
88. Id. at 639-40, 174 S.E.2d at 523.
89. See supra note 12.
90. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 151, 153, 161, 316 S.E.2d at 186, 187, 192 (1984). Cf. Hayes, 276
N.C. at 640, 174 S.E.2d at 524.
91. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 162, 316 S.E.2d at 192.
92. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-401 North Carolina comment (1965).
93. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 162, 316 S.E.2d at 192 (quoting Nasco Equipment Co. v. Mason,
291 N.C. 145, 153, 229 S.E.2d 278, 283-84 (1976)). See Clifford, Article Two: Sales, 44 N.C.L. REv.
539, 551 (1966); see also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (1968)
(theory of the UCC relegates the issue of title to a subordinate position in determining legal interests
in automobiles).
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Justice Exum noted that the Howerton court was not the first to resolve a
dispute involving transfer of title to an automobile without relying on the MVA.
He cited two pre-UCC cases, Hawkins v. M & J Finance Corp.9 4 and King
Homes, Inc. v. Bryson, 95 in which the North Carolina Supreme Court relied on
96
the common law of sales, not the MVA, to resolve title disputes.
In Hawkins plaintiff delivered two cars to a used car dealer, authorizing the
dealer to sell the cars. Plaintiff also delivered the certificates of title, but did not
execute an assignment of the certificates. The car dealer used the cars to secure
a loan from defendant, without plaintiff's permission. The dealer defaulted on
the loan, and the defendant took possession of one car. When plaintiff brought
an action for return of the car, the court relied on the common-law principles of
agency and entrustment, not on the provisions of the MVA, in reaching its decision. The court concluded that defendant had not acquired any rights to the
vehicle. 97 The Howerton court viewed the Hawkins decision as authority that
the MVA title provisions did not properly resolve all questions pertaining to
98
transfer of title to motor vehicles.
The Howerton court derived further support for this view from the decision
in King Homes. In King Homes a mobile home manufacturer delivered a mobile
home to a dealer, but did not assign or deliver a title certificate along with the
vehicle. The dealer paid for the mobile home by check. After delivering the
check to the manufacturer, the dealer sold the mobile home to defendant. When

the dealer's check was returned due to insufficient funds, the manufacturer
brought an action for return of the mobile home. The court held that title had
never passed to the dealer; therefore, the sale by the dealer to defendant was
invalid. The King Homes court reached this decision, not because a title certificate had not been delivered to the dealer, but because the dealer had never paid
the manufacturer.99
The Howerton court cited Hawkins and King Homes to demonstrate that
the decision to rely on the UCC instead of the MVA did not represent a break
with North Carolina precedent. 100 The Howerton court then decided not to ap94. 238 N.C. 174, 77 S.E.2d 669 (1953).
95. 273 N.C. 84, 159 S.E.2d 329 (1968).
96. The Howerton case itself was never framed as a wrongful sale by a bailee. It is possible that
application of these common-law concepts would have altered the court's analysis or decision.
97. Hawkins, 238 N.C. at 178-85, 77 S.E.2d at 672-77.
98. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 160, 316 S.E.2d at 190-91.
99. King Homes, 273 N.C. at 90-91, 159 S.E.2d at 333.
100. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 162-63, 316 S.E.2d at 191-92. Neither the Hawkins nor the King
Homes court, however, ignored the MVA completely. The Hawkins court stated that a bailee could
rightfully mortgage entrusted goods if the entruster had clothed the entrustee with sufficient indicia
of ownership. The Hawkins court used the MVA as an aid in applying this common-law principle.
The court found that because the certificates of title delivered to the dealer were not assigned in
compliance with the MVA, they could not constitute sufficient indicia of ownership. Hawkins, 238
N.C. at 179-80, 77 S.E.2d at 674-75. Likewise in King Homes, after holding that a mobile home was
a motor vehicle within the meaning of the MVA, the court found that the entrustee had not been
clothed with indicia of ownership sufficient to induce reasonable reliance on the part of the defendant, because the dealer had not delivered a Manufacturer's Certificate of Origin in compliance with
the MVA in force at the time. 273 N.C. at 91, 159 S.E.2d at 333. Today, under the UCC, it is
possible for an entrustee to convey ownership to a bona fide purchaser, regardless of the sufficiency
of the indicia of ownership with which the entrustee has been clothed. See infra note 104.
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ply the three-step standard adopted by the Hayes court, concluding that "the
provisions of the UCC and not the MVA properly resolve the contest" between
Clipper and Finance. 10 1
The drafters of the UCC, the court believed, intended the UCC to resolve
the type of title question presented in Howerton.10 2 Therefore, the court must
have believed that the provisions of the UCC established a more efficient and
more just means of determining legal interest in motor vehicles than the methods that the MVA provides. 103
The court, however, belied its own beliefs as it applied the provisions of the
UCC to the facts presented by Howerton. The court first dealt with the question
whether Clipper or Howerton had a superior right to the vehicle. The court
found the answer in section 2-403 of the UCC. 1 0 4 Under this section, title transferred completely to Howerton when he purchased the vehicle. Clipper transferred the vehicle to Adventure, a party in the business of selling such
vehicles, 10 5 clothing Adventure with the authority to transfer absolute ownership of the vehicle. Howerton purchased as a buyer in the ordinary course of
business,10 6 without notice that Adventure did not have absolute ownership of
the vehicle. Adventure, therefore, could transfer to Howerton all of Clipper's
right, title, and interest in the vehicle.
Clipper acknowledged that under the UCC it could not assert title superior
to Howerton's, but argued that its interest was greater than the interest held by
Finance. Clipper claimed its retention of the MSO to the vehicle reserved a
security interest in the vehicle, or in the alternative, in the installment sales con101. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 192-93. Other jurisdictions also have decided
that the UCC prevails over motor vehicle registration schemes and that title passes pursuant to the
UCC without completion of the statutory registration formalities. See, e.g., Indiana Ins. Co. v. Fidelity Gen. Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 204 (7th Cir. 1968) (ownership is question for jury); Semple v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 215 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Metropolitan Auto Sales v. Koneski,
252 Md. 145, 249 A.2d 141 (1969) (ownership is question for jury); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co.
v. Boykin, 251 S.C. 236, 161 S.E.2d 818 (1968) (title to vehicle passes notwithstanding want of
compliance with title certificate law); Park County Implement CoM'. Craig, 397 P.2d 800 (Wyo.
1964). The South Carolina rule stated in Boykin modified the rule established by a federal court
sitting in diversity in Lynch v. United States Gen. Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 327
F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1964) (under South Carolina law, passage of title effective only between buyer and
seller and does not affect rights of third-party insurance carrier). Several jurisdictions in which the
UCC has been adopted have decided that ownership does not pass until motor vehicle statute requirements are met. See, eg., Merchants Produce Bank v. Mack Trucks, 411 F.2d 1174 (8th Cir.
1969); Melton v. Prickett, 203 Kan. 501, 456 P.2d 34 (1969); Roe v. Flamegas Indus. Corp., 16
Mich. App. 210, 167 N.W.2d 835 (1969); McIntosh v. White, 447 S.W.2d 75 (Mo. 1969); Irion v.
Glens Falls Ins. Co., 54 Mont. 156, 461 P.2d 199 (1969); Forman v. Anderson, 183 Neb. 715, 163

N.W.2d 894 (1969).
102. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 193.
103. The MVA is designed to provide "a ready means by which all legal interests in motor
vehicles may be determined." Act of June 15, 1961, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 1134. The contest between Finance and Clipper, framed by the parties as a question of who had "superior title," clearly
seems to be a contest to decide who has a greater "legal interest."
104. "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives
him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of business." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 25-2-403(2) (1965).

105. Adventure maintained a lot for display of vehicles, and had had prior business dealings with
Clipper. Record at 9-11.
106. Id. at 12.
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tract to which Adventure and Howerton were the original parties. Finance
claimed a competing interest. Neither party had filed a financing statement to
protect and register its interest.
The court declined to decide whether retention of the MSO by Clipper created a security interest. 10 7 Clipper's failure to properly perfect its security interest, if any, prevented it from defeating Finance's interest, despite its retention of
10
the MSO.

s

The MVA sets forth some guidelines for determining the order of certain
competing security interests.l 0 9 The MVA expressly provides, however, that if a
manufacturer claims a security interest in a vehicle held in the inventory of that
manufacturer, the interest must be perfected by filing a financing statement in
accordance with the provisions of the UCC." 0 Clipper admitted that it had
retained the vehicle in inventory and had not filed a financing statement."'

Therefore, Clipper could not claim a security interest under the MVA.
Under the UCC, because Clipper's entire interest in the car had been trans107. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 167, 316 S.E.2d at 195. The UCC as adopted by North Carolina
states that "any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) in goods shipped or
delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to reservation of a security interest." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-2-401(1) (1965). For other North Carolina decisions stating that retention of documents of title
creates only a security interest, see Toyomenka, Inc. v. Mount Hope Finishing Co., 432 F.2d 722,
728 (4th Cir. 1970) (applying North Carolina law); Nasco Equipment Co. v. Mason, 291 N.C. 145,
155, 229 S.E.2d 278, 285 (1976). Some courts have held that automobile certificates of title are not
documents of title. See, e-g., Semple v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 215 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1963);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hayes, 276 N.C. 620, 174 S.E.2d 511 (1970). The Howerton court did
not address that question.
108. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 167, 316 S.E.2d at 195.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58 to -58.10 (1983). The UCC expressly provides that these sections
of the MVA apply to security interests in automobiles. The original version of the UCC enacted in
North Carolina provided that "[t]he filing provisions [of the UCC] do not apply to a security interest
in property subject to a statute. . . of this state which provides for central filing of, or which requires indication on a certificate of title of, such security interests in such property." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 25-9-302(3), (3)(b) (1965).
The effect [of this provision] is to preserve the operation of the North Carolina certificate of
title law relating to motor vehicles and the perfection of security interests therein ...
This North Carolina statute does not apply to security interests created by a dealer or
manufacturer who holds the vehicle for resale. . .; therefore, those security interests are
governed by the [UCC] filing provisions.
Id. § 25-9-302 North Carolina comment. This section was revised in 1975, to provide that although
filing a UCC statement is still not required to perfect a security interest in a vehicle that may be
perfected under the MVA, "during any period in which collateral is inventory held for sale by a
person who is in the business of selling goods of that kind, the filing provisions [of the UCC] apply to
a security interest in that collateral created by him as debtor." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-302(3)(b)
(Supp. 1983). See Myers, supra note 2,at § 30A.03(1). Adventure was a merchant in the business of
selling motor vehicles. See supra note 105. Clipper, however, maintained the vehicle in Clipper's
own inventory. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 166, 316 S.E.2d at 195. The Howerton court therefore concluded that, before it could be enforceable, any security interest created by Adventure as debtor
would have to be recorded by means of a financing statement. Id. at 167, 316 S.E.2d at 195. The
court also relied on N.C. GEN.STAT. § 20-58.8(b) (1983): "The provisions of [the MVA] shall not
apply to or affect. . .(3) A security interest in a vehicle created by a manufacturer. . . who holds
the vehicle in his inventory. Such security interest shall be perfected by filing a financing statement
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code." See J. WHrrE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, at
§ 22-4.
110. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-58.1 (1983). For legislative considerations in the enactment of this
provision, see infra note 127.
111. Record at 10.
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ferred (albeit arguably wrongly transferred) 112 to Howerton, Clipper could not
assert an interest in the car. 113 Clipper argued instead that it could claim an
interest in the installment sales contract. Clipper claimed this interest arose
when the vehicle, in which Clipper had an unperfected security interest, 114 was
sold. Clipper claimed it could assert an interest in the proceeds of this sale, 1 15
the installment sales contract. Finance also claimed an interest in this contract.
Finance argued that because Howerton had acquired an unqualified interest in
the vehicle, he could freely assign all or part of this title. Finance asserted that
Howerton had assigned a security interest to Adventure by means of the installment sales contract. Finance then purchased this interest from Adventure.
The court viewed the installment sales contract as chattel paper under the
UCC. 1 16 Under the UCC, if Finance had no knowledge 1 7 that Clipper was
asserting an interest in the contract, Clipper could not prevail against Finance.
If Finance knew the contract was subject to Clipper's interest, Finance would
still prevail if Clipper could claim an interest only because the contract was the
result of a sale of property in which Clipper had a security interest.1 18 Because
this was Clipper's only claim to an interest in the contract, Finance would prevail even if Finance could be charged with knowledge of Clipper's interest. The
Howerton court concluded, therefore, that there were no conceivable circumstances under which Clipper could assert title superior to Finance's."19
It is debatable whether the Howerton decision is in accord with the legislative policies that fostered the MVA and the UCC. The decision may conflict
with broad policy goals because the facts presented to the court slipped through
112. Finance argued that Adventure's action amounted to conversion. Defendant Appellant's
Brief at 5, American Clipper Corp. v. Howerton, 51 N.C. App. 539, 277 S.E.2d 136 (1981), rev'd,
311 N.C. 151, 316 S.E.2d 186 (1984).
113. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
114. Clipper argued that this unperfected interest arose by means of Clipper's retention of the
MSO. See Howerton, 311 N.C. at 166-67, 316 S.E.2d at 194-95.
115. Proceeds "includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds." With certain exceptions, the security interest in the collateral "continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 25-9-306(1), (2) (Supp. 1983).
116. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 167, 316 S.E.2d at 195. Chattel paper "means a writing or writings
which evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific goods."
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-105(l)(b) (Supp. 1983). The court of appeals did not determine whether
the installment sales contract was chattel paper, or what interests the contract created as between
Howerton and Clipper. See Howerton, 51 N.C. App. at 545, 277 S.E.2d at 139 (1981). The installment sales contract does not appear in the record, and it is unclear on what evidence the supreme
court based its finding that the contract was chattel paper.
117. Under the UCC, knowledge means actual knowledge. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(25)
(1965).
118. Clipper might have prevailed if it had filed a financing statement, recording a separate security agreement with the contract as collateral. See Coogan, PrioritiesAmong Secured Creditors
and the "FloatingLien" in IA SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (MB) § 7.09(3)0b) (1984); Clark, Abstract Rights Versus PaperRights Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 84 YALE L.J. 445, 450 (1974); Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. RPv. 282 (1965).
119. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 168, 316 S.E.2d at 195. Since Clipper could assert neither title nor
security interest superior to Howerton or Finance, Finance prevailed in the declaratory judgment
action. Id. at 170, 316 S.E.2d at 196-97. The supreme court therefore reversed the court of appeals.
Id. at 170, 316 S.E.2d at 197.
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some cracks in the latticework of the statutes. For example, the 1961 amendments to the MVA declared that "a certificate of title that can be relied upon as a

ready means by which all legal interests in motor vehicles may be determined
would be to the public interest." 1 2z0 The vehicle in question in Howerton, how-

ever, was not titled in North Carolina. 12 1 The provisions in the 1961 amend-

ments for determining interests in untitled vehicles were rather weak; even the

strengthening language added to the provisions in 1970 did not encompass all
situations. 122 No provisions yet have been made for cases in which a manufac-

turer fails to supply an MSO to the dealer to whom he transfers a vehicle. This
situtation occurs most often when, as in Howerton, a manufacturer consigns a
car to a dealer. There is no sale or contract to sell between the manufacturer
and the dealer at the time the car is transferred to the dealer. The manufacturer

retains the car in his inventory. The arrangement is viewed as an offer by the
manufacturer to sell the car to the dealer. When the dealer sells the car to a
consumer, he may be held to have accepted the offer of the manufacturer, and is
bound to pay the manufacturer. 123 Cases such as these are expressly removed
from the purview of the MVA. 124 The MVA is silent about the means by which
a consumer buying from a consignee-dealer is to learn about the manufacturer's
interest in the vehicle. The provisions regarding MSOs do not state whether a
transfer to a consumer from a dealer can be valid if the manufacturer has not
transferred an MSO to a dealer. 12 5 Also, the provisions of the MVA regarding
the perfection of security interests by notation on the title certificate do not ap120. Act of June 15, 1961, ch. 835, 1961 N.C. Sess. Laws 1134.
121. Record at 13.
122. See supranotes 73-74 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of 1961 amendments).
The applicable UCC sections provide specifically that a purchaser of chattel paper who gives value
for it takes priority over a security interest in that chattel paper if he acts without knowledge of the
interest, or "which is claimed merely as proceeds . . . even though [the purchaser of the chattel
paper] knows that the specific paper. . . is subject to a security interest." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9308 (1965). "The obvious intended effect of this provision is to prevent the supplier or financier of a
merchant from acquiring an automatic monopoly on the chattel paper of that merchant that results
from the sale of the inventory in which the supplier of financier had a security interest." Smith,
Article Nine: Secured Transactions-Perfectionsand Priorities,44 N.C.L. REv.753, 790-91 (1966);
see Coogan, PrioritiesAmong Secured Creditorsand the "FloatingLien" in 1A SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (MB) (1984).

123. "A principal purpose of consignments is to finance the buyer and maintain a kind of security interest in the seller." Hawkland, ConsignmentSelling Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 67
COM. L.J. 146, 147 (1962). The mere act of consignment does not maintain a true security because
the seller may lose the interest in the vehicle when it is sold to a bona fide consumer, and may have
no interest in the proceeds. See supra notes 104-118 and accompanying text. Note also that a
consignment differs from a "sale or return." In a sale or return, the buyer gets complete title to the
goods, with an option to return them if unsatisfactory. The seller maintains no interest. See 2
WILLISTON, SALES § 270 (Rev. ed. 1948). The Howerton court found the transaction between Clipper and Adventure to be a consignment. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 163, 316 S.E.2d at 193.
124. "The provisions of [the MVA] shall not apply to or affect. . .(3) A security interest in a
vehicle created by a manufacturer. . . who holds the vehicle in his inventory." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-58.1 (1983). See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
125. "(a) Any manufacturer. . . shall. .. supply the transferee with a manufacturer's certificate of origin assigned to the transferee. . .(c) no title to a new motor vehicle acquired by a dealer
under the provisions of [subsection] (a). . .shall pass or vest until" the dealer assigns the MSO to
the consumer purchaser. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-52.1 (1983). It is clear that the dealer cannot transfer the title the manufacturer has transferred to the dealer, unless the dealer assigns the MSO. This
section is unclear about the state of title that results from the failure of a manufacturer to deliver an
MSO.
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ply if a manufacturer has consigned the vehicle to a dealer and maintained the

vehicle in the manufacturer's own inventory. 1 26 In this situation, the MVA system for utilizing the title certificate (or MSO if no certificate has yet been issued)

as a determinative representation of legal interests breaks down.
North Carolina, with the amendments to section 9-302 of the UCC in
1975127 and with the Howerton decision, has utilized the UCC to prop up the
MVA in these situations. A more equitable and efficient system, however, could
be constructed by fleshing out the provisions of the MVA.

The provisions of the UCC often are inadequate to resolve disputes arising
out of consignment situations such as the one in Howerton. In the words of two

leading commentators, "the Code's handling of consignments is fraught with
uncertainty, and the Code cases on the subject clear up little."' 128 Much of the

confusion lies in the interpretation of the UCC sections which provide that consignors may perfect security interests in consigned goods in ways other than by
filing financing statements. 129 Clipper clearly did none of the things which,
under the UCC, would have perfected its interest. Even had Clipper attempted

perfection as the UCC consignment sections direct, however, Clipper still may
not have prevailed; courts often are reluctant to allow such perfection, and cases
interpreting these sections have been conflicting. 130 If the consignor chooses not
to file a financing statement, the UCC provides that he can perfect his security

interest by posting a sign at the consignee's premises as evidence of his interest. 13 1 This provision certainly may help to provide notice to bona fide purchasers of consigned vehicles, but it may hinder the DMV in its efforts to centralize
recordation of liens. If, on the other hand, the consignor elects to file a financing

statement, the bona fide purchaser is put in jeopardy. He may not know that he
must search the office of the county register of deeds, where the financing statement may be filed,13 2 to investigate possible liens on consigned vehicles. In ad126. Id. § 20-58.1.
127. These amendments were basically a compromise. The buying public has come to rely on
the MVA "as the primary source of protection and information as to prior liens," while professional
lenders and borrowers who deal with inventory as inventory want to retain one-stop financing, and
rely solely on the UCC registration system as a recordation device for all liens. Mack Financial
Corp. v. Western Leasing, Inc., Bankruptcy No. B74-4082 (C-8) (D. Or. 1975) (unpublished op.),
reprinted in SECURED FINANCING FOR THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 153 (PLI 1980); see also
Josephson, Financingof Trucks in SECURED FINANCING FOR THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 41,
45-63 (PLI 1980) (discussion of most common problems arising out of motor vehicles).
128. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 22-4, at 883.
129. The North Carolina UCC provisions allow priority to the consignor's interest if the consignor files a UCC financing statement, places a sign evidencing his interest at the consignee's place
of business, or establishes that the consignee is generally known to be in the business of selling the
goods of others. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-326(3) (1965). The Howerton court found that Clipper
had done none of these things. Howerton, 311 N.C. at 164-65, 316 S.E.2d at 193-94.
130. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1, § 22-4, at 883.
131. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-326 (3)(a) (1965).
132. If the collateral which is the subject of the security interest is consumer goods, the financing
statement must be filed in the county in which the debtor resides, or if the debtor is not a state
resident, then in the county where the collateral is located. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-401 (1965).
Consumer goods are goods bought for personal, family, or household use. Id. § 25-9-109. Motor
vehicles purchased for personal use are consumer goods. See J. WHirE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 1,
§ 23-7, at 923.
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dition, filing financing statements with the county registers of deeds undermines
the centralization of lien recordation with the DMV.
Certain other provisions of the UCC may put a consignor such as Clipper
at the mercy of a dishonest consignee. The consignee may transfer the consignor's entire title to a consigned vehicle. 133 Some courts have suggested that a
consignor can curtail these risks "by audits and accounting procedures or he can
1 34
refuse to knowingly expose himself to the risk with the particular dealer."'
Many vehicles are transferred to consignees located at some distance from the
consignor, however, so these procedures may be particularly burdensome.
It may be possible to relieve burdens on consignors and consumers by
strengthening the provisions of the MVA. Consignors should be required to
transfer an MSO to a consignee/dealer. Furthermore, the MSO should indicate
the consignment arrangement and any security interest created by the arrangement. The MVA should not allow a dealer to transfer any title to such a vehicle
without transfer of this MSO marked "consigned vehicle." When the consumer
applies for a title certificate, he would be required to submit this MSO. The
DMV thus would have a record of the security interest, and it would be noted on
the certificate of title. This security interest would then be treated as other interests recorded under the MVA.
In conclusion, it seems that the Howerton court correctly applied the letter
of the law existing at the time of the decision. This decision, however, should
alert the general assembly to possible flaws in the framework of the MVA. The
general assembly should take steps to shore up this framework by lessening the
scope of the Howerton court's decision to apply the UCC over the MA. It
would be inconsistent with the policy of the state if the UCC were to be substituted for the MVA as the guide for determining all legal interests in motor vehicles. The general assembly has spent fifty years fashioning a reliable certificate
of title statute. The Howerton decision should not be allowed to eviscerate the
statute. An updating of the MVA to regulate consignment sales more strictly
will ensure the continuing vitality of the MVA.
PETER JAMES MCGRATH, JR.

133. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-2-403(2) (1965). See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
134. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 533 (1968).

